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v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377 (1977).

Isaac Allen was tried in a New Jersey court on charges of armed
robbery and felony murder. 1 A mistrial resulted when the jury failed
to reach a unanimous verdict. 2 At the second trial, an evidentiary
hearing was to be conducted on the admissibility of an alleged confession by the defendant. 3 Upon the requests of both the prosecution
and the defense, the trial court issued a protective order prohibiting
the publication of testimony given at the evidentiary hearing until
after the jury was sequestrated for deliberation. 4 Although the jury
was to be removed from the courtroom for the hearing, the trial court
was concerned that the jurors might subsequently learn of the events
I State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 136, 373 A.2d 377, 378 (1977). The criminal charges levied
against Allen were for his alleged participation in the robbery of a bar in which a patron was
killed by a shotgun blast fired at point-blank range. Brief for the State of New Jersey at 1, State
v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for State]. The incident
generated massive pretrial publicity at the defendant's first trial, causing the court to impanel a
foreign jury. Id.; see N.J.R. 3:14-2, -3. In fact, the trial court in the defendant's second trial
noted that armed robbery and felony murder "are the type of allegations which often are the
subject of extensive coverage." Brief of Aggrieved Parties/Appellants Gannett Company, Inc.
and the Home News Publishing Company, Inc., app. C at 2, State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 373
A.2d 377 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant, Gannett Co.].
2 State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 136, 373 A.2d 377, 379 (1977).
1 State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 135, 373 A.2d 377, 378 (1977). The New Jersey Supreme
Court noted that when the admissibility of state's evidence is challenged during the course of a
trial, it is the "usual practice" of New Jersey courts to remove the jury from the courtroom for
the duration of the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 136, 373 A.2d at 378. If the evidence is found to
be admissible, the jury will be recalled and presented with that evidence. Id. However, if the
evidence is deemed inadmissible, the state is estopped from using it at trial. Id.
4 Brief for Appellant, Gannett Co., supra note 1, at 3-4. A protective order, within the
context of this Note, is an order by a court to prevent persons (primarily members of the press)
present at a judicial proceeding from disseminating information regarding that proceeding. See
State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 135, 136, 373 A.2d 377, 378 (1977). The order is premised on the
court's belief that such reporting would be detrimental to the assurance of a fair trial. See id. at
136, 373 A.2d at 378. As used in this Note, the term "protective" order is interchangeable with
the terms "restrictive" order and "gag" order. Compare id. at 136, 137, 373 A.2d at 379 with id.
at 156, 373 A.2d at 389 (Pashman, J., concurring).
In the instant case, upon issuing the protective order, the trial judge stated that "my
decision at this moment is this: that the order will be that nothing which takes place outside the
presence of the jury is to be printed. That includes anything said since I took the bench this
morning." Brief for Appellant, Gannett Co., supra note 1, app. C at 4. The order would,
therefore, even preclude the media from reporting that a press restriction was ordered by the
trial court. The protective order was issued by the trial court prior to jury selection in an
attempt to establish guidelines for the upcoming trial. Id. app. C at 2. Curiously, a similar
protective order was issued by the court conducting the first Allen trial, but the order was not
appealed. Brief for State, supra note 1, at 1-2.
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that had transpired in their absence through media reports of the
proceedings. 5 Prior to the issuance of the order, the trial court considered and rejected several alternatives to the granting of the protective order, including sequestration of the jury and the issuance of
6
cautionary instructions.
Shortly thereafter, counsel for the two newspapers, the
Courier-News and the Home News, whose reporters were subject to
the protective order, appeared before the trial judge to contest the
order. 7 The newspapers alleged that the order was a prior restraint
8
of publication, violative of both state and federal constitutions.
Nonetheless, the trial court upheld the order with slight modifications
and proceeded to hold the evidentiary hearing.9 A motion for leave
5 See Brief for Appellant, Gannett Co., supra note 1, app. C at 5-6.

A defendant has a constitutional right to a fair trial, as provided by federal and state constitutions. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. In like manner, the New Jersey Constitution states that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.
N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 10.

6 State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 136, 373 A.2d 377, 379 (1977); Brief for Appellant, Gannett
Co., supra note 1, at 5-6. The court doubted the effectiveness of issuing cautionary instructions
in the event that inadmissible evidence came to the attention of the jurors through press reports, since it is "extremely difficult to tell them [jurors] to disregard something they have
heard." Id. app. C at 6. Furthermore, the trial court was opposed to the use of a jury sequestration, for it believed that to sequester a jury for the projected ur to six week-long trial would
be unduly harsh and burdensome upon the jurors. 73 N.J. at 136, 373 A.2d at 379.
7 Brief for Appellant, Gannett Co., supra note 1, at 4.
8 Id. Freedom of the press is guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States
Constitution, which provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Similarly, the New Jersey
Constitution states that: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 6.
In addition to the constitutional claims, counsel for the newspapers argued that the trial
court could have employed alternative measures to protect the defendant's rights, without imposition of restraint upon the press. See Brief for Appellant, Gannett Co., supra note 1, at 4.
Counsel also maintained that the court's order was procedurally defective, since the court
lacked jurisdiction over the reporters and the newspapers. Id.
9 Brief for Appellant, Gannett Co., supra note 1, at 4-5. The trial court feared "that publication of testimony ruled inadmissible would present a clear and present danger to the administration of justice and the right of the defendant to a fair trial." Id. app. A at 3. To prevent
such harm, the court reinstated a slightly modified version of its order, which provided:
Publication of inculpatory testimony taken outside the presence of the jury at
evidentiary hearings held to determine the admissibility of said testimony which
after hearing the court determines it is inadmissible ....
is prohibited until the
jury is sequestered to deliberate its verdict.
State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 135, 373 A.2d 377, 378 (1977). This order, rather than the trial
court's initial order, was the directive considered by the supreme court. The modified order was
less restrictive than the court's initial order, in that evidence found inadmissible by the trial
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to appeal the trial court's order was presented to the appellate division, but was denied. 10 A similar motion was granted by the supreme court; however, it was entered two days after the jury had
returned its verdict. 1
In a factually related case, John Hughes and his co-defendant,
Richard Thompson, were convicted of murder and robbery. 12 Their
convictions were reversed by the appellate division on the grounds
that the prosecutor had made prejudicial remarks during summation.' 3 On retrial, a doubt arose as to the testimonial capacity of a
state's witness. 1 4 The prosecutor, therefore, requested that the witness be examined out of the presence of the jury, in order to determine whether she was in fact a competent witness.1 5 The trial judge
granted the request and sua sponte ordered a newspaper reporter
present in the courtroom not to report on the events which took
place out of the jury's presence. 16 This restrictive order, as well as
an almost identical second order issued later that day, was to remain
court could be published upon completion of the trial, the original order made no such provision. Compare Brief for Appellant, Gannett Co., supra note 1, app. C at 4 (original order) with
73 N.J. at 132, 135, 373 A.2d at 377, 378 (modified version).
After issuing its order, the trial court conducted a hearing on the defendant's alleged confession, and ruled it admissible. 73 N.J. at 136, 373 A.2d at 379. Since the press was solely
prohibited from reporting on evidence ruled inadmissible by the court, "as a practical matter,
the order was inoperative as to anything that took place at trial." Id. at 136-37, 373 A.2d at 379.
10 State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 137, 373 A.2d 377, 379 (1977). The appeal of the trial court's
order was taken by the two newspaper publishing companies (the Gannett Co. and the Home
News Publishing Co.) whose papers (the Courier-News and the Home-News, respectively) were
subject to the protective order. Brief for Appellant, Gannett Co., supra note 1, at 1. Both
publishing companies retained the same counsel on appeal. Id.
1 State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 137, 373 A.2d 377, 379 (1977). For the text of the supreme
court's order granting the appeal, see State v. Allen, 70 N.J. 153, 358 A.2d 199 (1976).
12 State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 137, 373 A.2d 377, 379 (1977). The Hughes case also attracted
much publicity due to the serious nature of the crime. In Hughes, the defendants Hughes and
Thompson, along with Thompson's younger brother, were alleged to have murdered a man

carrying an armload of Christmas presents after the man had refused their demand for money.
Brief for State, supra note 1, at 4. The defendants then allegedly fled from the scene of the
crime in a hail of gunfire. Id. at 4-5.
'3 State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 137, 373 A.2d 377, 379 (1977).
' State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 137, 373 A.2d 377, 379 (1977). There were also indications
that the witness would recant her previously given written statement, which placed Hughes and
Thompson at the scene of the crime. Id.
is State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 137, 373 A.2d 377, 379 (1977).
16 State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 137, 373 A.2d 377, 379 (1977). The restrictive order was
issued orally from the bench, without prior notice. Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellant,
Trenton Times Corp. at 3, State v. Hughes, 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Brief for Appellant, Trenton Times Corp.]. For an explanation of "restrictive" order, see note
4 supra. In its order, the court stated: "I charge you specifically, Mr. Norman [a Trenton Times
reporter], this [the prospective witness' testimony] is out of the presence of the jury and not to
be reported in your paper until the Jury Verdict is presented." Id. at Ia.
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in effect until the jury had reached a verdict.1 7 The witness in question was examined and found by the trial court to be incompetent to

testify. 18

a

The following day, counsel for the Trenton Times, one of the two
newspapers subject to the order, appeared before the trial court and
unsuccessfully sought to have the "orders vacated on First Amendment grounds."' 9 An application to the appellate division, for an
emergency stay of the order pending the outcome of a motion for
leave to appeal, was also denied. 20 Some five days later, the New
Jersey supreme court granted a similar petition praying for
emergency relief to stay the trial court's order. 2 ' By this time
though, the criminal case had already gone to the jury, yet a mistrial
was declared for a second time since the jury failed to reach a verdict. 22 Subsequently on its own motion, the supreme court certified
and granted the appellant's petition for leave to appeal then pending

17 State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 137-38, 373 A.2d 377, 379 (1977). Since the initial order was
directed at a specific reporter, it was necessary to issue a second order when two different
reporters appeared at the afternoon court seesion. See Brief for Appellant, Trenton Times
Corp., supra note 16, at 2. At the latter session, the trial judge ordered the two newspaper
correspondents not " 'to report in your paper[s] until after the verdict has been reached in this
case, what will now take place in this courtroom out of the presence of the jury.' " Id. at 2-3.
18 State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 138, 373 A.2d 377, 379 (1977). At the hearing, the witness
recanted her previous testimony. Id. The trial court, however, found the witness to have been
under the influence of methadone while testifying, and therefore refused to admit her testimony
into evidence. Id.
19 State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 138, 373 A.2d 377, 379-80 (1977); see note 8 supra. Although
two reporters from the Trenton Times and one reporter from another local newspaper were
subject to the restrictive orders, only the Trenton Times appealed the trial court's orders. See
73 N.J. at 138, 373 A.2d at 379-80; Brief for Appellant, Trenton Times Corp., supra note 16, at
2-3.
As in Allen, the trial court in Hughes considered and rejected several alternatives to issuing
the restrictive orders. Brief for Appellant, Trenton Times Corp., supra at lla-12a. The Hughes
court found the use of jury sequestration to be "entirely too expensive." Id. at 12a. It also
rejected the use of in camera proceedings which would totally bar press coverage, and questioned the effectiveness of jury admonitions once a major news article had been widely publicized. Id. at lla-12a. The Hughes court was also influenced by the fact that during the previous week the Trenton Times had published a "highly prejudicial" article concerning another
case, which caused a court in that case to sequester the jury. 73 N.J. at 141, 373 A.2d at 381;
Brief for Appellant, Trenton Times Corp., supra at 10a. Thus, the Hughes court stated that "[i]f
the papers will not exercise reasonable discretion, the Court has to take other steps." Brief for
Appellant, Trenton Times Corp., supra at Ila.
20 State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 138, 373 A.2d 377, 380 (1977).

21 State v. Hughes, 70 N.J. 153, 358 A.2d 200 (1976).
22 State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 138, 373 A.2d 377, 380 (1977). The appellant, Trenton Times
Corp., claimed that if the supreme court did not issue the stay, the restrictive order would have
remained in effect despite the mistrial, since by its terms the order would not expire until the
jury had rendered a verdict. Brief for Appellant, Trenton Times Corp., supra note 16, at 4.
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in the appellate division. 2 3 The court also ordered that the Hughes
24
and Allen cases be joined on appeal.
25
Upon review of the appeals, the supreme court in State v. Allen
held that orders which restrain the reporting of open, i.e., publicly held, court proceedings were "clearly illegal," and therefore vacated both trial courts' orders. 2 6 Justice Sullivan, writing for the
majority, was of the opinion that proceedings held in open court "are
matters of public record," on which the media has "an absolute right
to report." 2 7 To prevent similar controversies from arising in the
future, the court recommended the use of various alternatives, including sequestration, cautionary instructions, and in camera proceedings. 2 8 It was posited that such alternatives would allow the defend29
ant a fair trial without imposing direct restraints upon the press.
When a court seeks to prevent dissemination of information by
the media, the question arises whether such action constitutes a prior
restraint on publication. 3' The issue of prior restraint of the press
was first addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson.3 1 In that case, an injunction had been imposed on Near, restraining him from further publication of his newspaper, pursuant to a state statute prohibiting publication of "'malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper[s]."' 3 2 Although the
23 State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 138, 373 A.2d 377, 380 (1977).

24 Brief for Appellant, Trenton Times Corp., supra note 16, at 30a. The supreme court
found the two cases to "present a common legal issue of fundamental and far-reaching importance to the news media and to the administration of justice." State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 135,
373 A.2d 377, 378 (1977).
25 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377 (1977).
26 Id. at 139, 146, 373 A.2d at 380, 383.
27 Id. at 139, 373 A.2d at 380; see, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568
(1976) (right of press to report on open court preliminary hearings); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 349-50 (1966) (necessity of maintaining trials open to the public); Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (that which occurs in a courtroom is "public property," and may be freely
reported upon); accord, State v. Demko, 56 N.J. Super. 193, 194, 152 A.2d 167, 167 (Somerset
County Ct. 1959) (dictum) (right of a newspaper to report on what transpires in a courtroom).
28 73 N.J. at 141-42, 373 A.2d at 381-82.
21 See id. at 143-44, 373 A.2d at 382.
30 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556-62 (1976); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
31 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
32 Id. at 702, 705-06. The article published by Near which gave rise to his prosecution
contained accusations of corruption and neglect of duty by public officials. Id. at 704. At trial,
defendant Near contended that his first amendment right to publish was protected from state
interference by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 699, 705. The trial
court was unpersuaded, and enjoined Near from further publication. Id. at 706. This decision
was upheld by the Minnesota supreme court. Id. The defendant then appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. Id. at 707.
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state courts upheld the validity of the statute, the Supreme Court, on
33
appeal, found it to be unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, concluded that
the effect of the statute was to suppress or censor offending newspapers, rather than to redress or punish their wrongful acts. 34 In the
opinion of the Court, by prohibiting publication of "scandalous" material, valid exposes, such as the uncovering of government corruption,
could also be prevented. 35 The possibility that one might be wrongly
accused was deemed to be an insufficient justification for such a prohibition on the press, since recourse was available through existing
libel laws. 36 While recognizing that freedom of the press is not an
absolute right, 37 the Court noted that the first amendment guarantee
of freedom of the press has historically operated as an immunity from
prior restraint of publication, as well as from censorship. 38 Therefore, the Court stated that punishment of the press for abuse of its
33 Id. at 722-23.
34 Id. at 709-12. The Court stated that the statute did not deal with the punishment of
individual wrongful offenses, but rather provided for contempt proceedings if a court order,
issued under the statute, was not obeyed. Id. at 715. Therefore, the Court concluded that the
statute merely provided "for suppression and injunction, that is, for restraint upon publication."
id.
35 Id. at 710. The statute was, in effect, overbroad for it did not adequately define a "'scandalous and defamatory"' publication. See id. at 712. Since the uncovering of government corruption would "by [its] very nature create a public scandal," publication of such material would
violate the statute. Id. at 710.
36 Id.

at 715.

37 Id. at 708. Freedom of the press is safeguarded from state action by the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 707; see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (first amendment is
applicable to states through the fourteenth amendment). A state, however, retains the power to
punish the press for an abuse of the privileges accorded it by the first amendment. 283 U.S. at
708.
38 283 U.S. at 716. The belief that the press should remain free from restraint of publication
has existed in the United States even prior to the writing of the Constitution. 73 N.J. 132,
171-72, 373 A.2d 377, 396 (Schreiber, J., concurring). Although many early state constitutions
provided for freedom of the press, id. at 171, 373 A.2d at 396, the New Jersey Constitution was
devoid of any such provision until 1844, when an article comparable to the federal constitutional
provision was adopted. Brief for State, supra note 1, at 15-16; see N.J. CONST. OF 1844 art. I,
para. 5.
Despite the protections accorded the press through the first amendment, the Near Court
stated that a court could issue a prior restraint on publication in "exceptional cases." 283 U.S. at
716. The Court narrowly confined the issuance of such a prior restraint to the following types of
materials: (1) obscenity; (2) that which incites violence or insurrection; and, (3) publications
compromising the nation's military security. Id. This position of the Court, however, has shifted
over the years. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 590-91 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). It is now conceded that the first two types of materials comprise "situations in

which the 'speech' involved is not encompassed within the meaning of the First Amendment."
Id. at 590. As for the third category, Justice Brennan has observed that it "has never served as
the basis for actually upholding a prior restraint against the publication of constitutionally protected materials." Id. at 591.
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constitutional privilege would only be appropriate if subsequent to
39
the violation.
Later cases furthered the Near principle by establishing evidentiary requirements in prior restraint actions. 40 In Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 41 several publishers challenged the constitutionality
of a Rhode Island commission, which was empowered to investigate
and recommend for prosecution dealers in obscene or "objectionable"
material. 4 2 The state courts were divided over whether the commission's activities were violative of the first amendment; however, on
appeal, the Supreme Court held such activities to be unconstitutional. 43 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, found the commission's threat of legal sanctions, for lack of compliance with its
directives, operated to suppress the circulation of various publications. 4 4 Thus, the distribution of publications within the state was
subject "to a system of prior administrative restraints." 45 Tile Court
characterized its displeasure with the utilization of prior restraints by
cautioning that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression ...
bear[s] a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."46
39 283 U.S. at 720.
40 See, e.g.,

Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (one seek-

ing to impose prior restraint has "a heavy burden" to prove its necessity) Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (prior restraints are presumptively invalid); accord, Hurwitz v.
Boyle, 117 N.J. Super. 196, 204, 284 A.2d 190, 194-95 (App. Div. 1971).
41 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
42 Id. at 59-61, 60 n.I. The appellants were opposed to various practices employed by the
commission to restrict the sale of material it deemed to be objectionable. Id. at 64. Ordinarily,

the practice of the commission was to notify distributors that it had found a particular publication undesirable for sale to minors. Id. at 61. The notification included a reminder that the local
police authorities had been apprised of the objectionable material, and that the state attorney
general would take action in cases of noncompliance. Id. at 62-63. These practices were found
by the trial court to have the effect of intimidating distributors into compliance with the commission's dictates under threat of prosecution. Id. at 63-64.
43 Id. at 61, 64. Although the trial court refused to declare unconstitutional the law establishing the commission, it did enjoin the commission from continuing its intimidating activities.
Id. at 61. An appeal was taken by several publishers to the Rhode Island supreme court, which
reversed the lower court's granting of injunctive relief. Id. This decision, in turn, was reversed
by the Supreme Court, with the majority finding the commission's activities violative of the first
and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 64.
14 Id. at 67. The Court noted that the mere threat of prosecution operated as an "informal"
means of censorship, which "sufficiently inhibit[ed] the circulation of publications to warrant
injuctive relief." Id. (footnote omitted).
45Id. at 70.
46 id. The presumed invalidity of a prior restraint on publication has been recognized by the
Court in subsequent cases. In Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971),
the petitioner, a community organization, was enjoined from distributing leaflets opposing, as
racially biased, the sales practices ("blockbusting") of a local real estate dealer. Id. at 417-18.
The Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari, and vacated the state court injunction. Id. at
420. Chief Justice Burger, for the majority, compared the petitioner's conduct, in trying to
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Attempts to restrain the press from specifically reporting on
court proceedings are further complicated by the notion that trials are
public events. 4 7 A notable case regarding the right of the press to
cover court proceedings is Craig v. Harney.4 8 In Craig, several
newspapermen were convicted of criminal contempt for publishing
news articles and editorials criticizing an ongoing forcible detainer
case. 49 The trial judge believed that the publications misrepresented
the court proceedings in an attempt to generate public pressure upon
the judge to grant a new trial. 50 A state court had denied the defendants' ,petition for habeas corpus relief, but the decision was reversed
by the Supreme Court. 51
Upon review, the Court stated that "[a] trial is a public event
[and] [w]hat transpires in the courtroom is public property." 52 Therefore, the Court concluded that one who observes what takes place in
court can report on it with impunity, even though the reporting may

be somewhat inaccurate. 53 The Court went on to reject the state
court's contention that the published matter created "a clear and pres-

influence public opinion, to that of a newspaper. Id. at 419. Relying on the holding in Bantam
Books that prior restraints were presumptively invalid, the Court declared that the "'[r]espondent thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint."
Id. Although the respondent alleged that the distribution of leaflets violated his right of privacy,
the Court held that "[h]e has not met that burden" which would warrant a restraint. Id. at
418-19.
47 For representative cases upholding the right of the press to report on courtroom proceedings, see note 27 supra.
331 U.S. 367 (1947).
49 Id. at 368-70. In the forcible detainer action, the judge "instructed" the jury prior to
deliberation to find for the plaintiff. Id. at 369. The jury, however, despite the judge's instructions, returned a verdict for the defendant, whereupon the judge refused to accept the verdict,
and asked the jury to redeliberate. Id. The jury again reached a verdict in favor of the defendant, and the judge refused to accept the jury's decision for the second time. Id. After deliberating for the third time, the jury found for the plaintiff, but stated that it did so tinder
"coercion of the court." Id. Local newspapers criticized the judge, a layman, for taking the case
from the jury, terming his action "a 'travesty on justice.' Id.
50 Id. at 370. The defendants contended that they reported what would have been the
normal observations of an average person attending the trial. Id. They maintained that the
purpose of the publications was not to influence the judge in deciding the case, but rather to
make him exercise greater care in the administration of his judicial duties. Id.
51 Id. at 370, 378.
52 Id. at 374. With regard to publication of trial proceedings, the Court further noted that
"'[there is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other
institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in
proceedings before it." Id.
" See id. at 374-75. Justice Douglas acknowledged that the newspaper reports of events
that had transpired at the trial were incomplete and "unfair." Id. at 374. He noted, however,
that inaccuracies in reporting were commonplace occurrences, which would not warrant the imposition of a court's contempt power. See id. at 374-75.
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ent danger" to the administration of justice. 54 To satisfy such a requirement, the Court stated that it would have to be shown that the
55
threat to justice was "imminent," and not merely likely to occur.
The right of the press to report on events which transpired in a
courtroom was against issue in Sheppard v. Maxwell. 56 In Sheppard,
the defendant was indicted for having murdered his pregnant
wife. 5 7 The care was surrounded by massive pretrial publicity, and
the defendant was eventually tried amid extensive press coverage. 58
54 Id. at 376-78. The state court relied upon the "clear and present danger" doctrine, as
applied to publications by the Supreme Court in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Id.
at 371. Bridges, and its companion case, Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 314 U.S. 252
(1941), involved the appeal of a union leader and a newspaper corporation, who were convicted
of contempt for commenting upon litigation then pending before state courts. Id. at 258-59,
271, 275-76. The state courts maintained that the publications interfered with the orderly administration of justice, while the defendants contended that their actions were protected by the
first amendment. Id. at 258-59. Although the state supreme court upheld their convictions, the
United States Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, reversed. Id. at 253, 278-79.
Since the state legislature did not provide guidelines detailing in what circumstances commentary upon pending litigation would be punishable, id. at 260, the Court adopted the "clear
and present danger" standard of Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (an action will
not be permitted if it threatens to cause an "evil" that Congress has sought to prevent). In
defining this standard, the Bridges Court attempted to delineate the "'likelihood"' and "'proximity and degree"' of danger presented by a publication, which would be sufficient to necessitate a restraint. 314 U.S. at 261. The Court determined that "the likelihood, however great,
that a substantive evil will result cannot alone justify a restriction upon freedom of speech or
the press. The evil itself must be 'substantial,' . . . it must be 'serious."' Id. at 262. Furthermore, the Court posited that "the degree of imminence [must be] extremely high before utterances can be punished." Id. at 263. Based on the record before it, the Court found the criticisms and comments made by the petitioners in no way posed a threat to the fair administration
of justice. Id. at 273, 278.
Subsequent cases have dealt with the ability of a court to exercise its contempt power to
curb commentary on pending litigation. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67
A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
55 331 U.S. at 376, In reviewing the published matter at issue, the Court stated:
The vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the power to
punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not
merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be
remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil.
Id.
56 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
57 Id. at 335, 341.
5 Id. at 337-49. From the outset of the homicide investigation, Sheppard was the principle
suspect. Id. at 337. Amid press charges that "somebody is 'getting away with murder,"' a live,
televised, public inquest took place in a school gymnasium. Id. at 339. Editorials soon called for
Sheppard's arrest, and shortly thereafter, he was arrested and charged with murder. Id. at 341.
Throughout the pretrial and trial stages, the press reported on evidence damaging to Sheppard,
although much of the evidence was never introduced at trial. See id. at 340, 348. During the
proceedings, the courtroom was so crowded with reporters that many were seated within the
area normally reserved for the parties and their attorneys. Id. at 343. The court also allowed the
press to establish special broadcasting facilities within the courthouse. Id.
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Sheppard was convicted of second-degree murder, and after several
unsuccessful state court appeals, he petitioned the federal courts for
habeas corpus relief.59 Petitioner Sheppard alleged that he had been
denied a fair trial because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity surrounding his prosecution. 60 The Supreme Court ultimately granted
certiorari, and subsequently held that the petitioner had been denied
a fair trial in violation of the due process clause o the fourteenth
amendment. 61 This decision was based upon a finding by the Court
that the trial judge failed to protect the defendant from the media's
62
prejudicial publicity and its disruptive courtroom activities.
Justice Clark, writing for the majority, was generally supportive
of the press, stating that "justice cannot survive behind walls of silence ....
63
The Court recognized the unique role of the press as
public guardian, since by subjecting the judicial system to extensive
scrutiny through its reporting, the press could help to prevent "miscarriage[s] of justice."- 64 Nevertheless, Justice Clark noted that to
prevent a recurrence of the "carnival atmosphere" which existed during the Sheppard trial, a court should use its inherent power to control "the courtroom and courthouse premises." 6 5 It would, therefore, be within the power of the court not only to provide for orderly
press coverage, but also to insulate witnesses from the press prior to
59 Id. at 335 & n.1. Sheppard's conviction was affirmed by the Ohio court of appeals, State
v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1955), and the state supreme court,
State v. Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340 (1956). The United States Supreme Court
denied Sheppard's petition for certiorari to review his conviction. Sheppard v. Ohio, 352 U.S
910 (1956). Sheppard then applied for, and was granted, a writ of habeas corpus by the United
States district court. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964). This decision,
however, was reversed by the court of appeals. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.
1965).
60 384 U.S. at 335. For a discussion of the nature of the publicity, see note 58 supra.
61 Id.; see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 382 U.S. 916 (1965) (granting certiorari).
62 384 U.S. at 355, 357. For a description of the prejudicial and disruptive press activities,
see note 58 supra.
63 384 U.S. at 349; see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268 (1948) ("Anglo-American" system of
jurisprudence is characterized by its "distrust for secret trials").
64 384 U.S. at 350. Justice Clark commended the press for the services that it had rendered
over the centuries, stating:
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration ....
The press does not simply publish information about trials
but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. This Court has,
therefore, been unwilling to place any direct limitations on the freedom traditionally
exercised by the news media . . ..

Id. In the preceding term, the same Court had acknowledged the important role of the press
in guarding against governmental corruption by providing for an informed citizenry. Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
65 384 U.S. at 358.
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testifying, and to control the release of information by all persons
66
involved in the case.
Since the Sheppard Court did not establish specific rules or possible sanctions which could be employed by a trial court to promote a
fair trial, 67 many courts attempted to protect defendants by issuing
restrictive or "gag" orders. 68 Much of the uncertainty existing after
Sheppard, concerning the proper procedures for courts to follow to
protect both the rights of the defendant and the press, was ultimately
resolved by the Supreme Court in Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart.6 9 Nebraska involved the issuance of a restrictive order pursuant to the prosecution of Erwin Simants, who was accused of
murdering a family of six in a town of only 850 inhabitants. 70 Re66 Id. at 358-62. The number of news reporters permitted in the courtroom at one time
could be limited, and their conduct subject to regulation by the court. Id. at 358. See also Estes
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 544 (1965)'(proscribing the televising of courtroom proceedings). With
regard to the release of information to the press, the Sheppard Court did not specify how
witnesses may be "insulated" from the press, as well as from other witnesses, or the extent to
which they could be prevented from disclosing their testimony prior to testifying in court. 384
U.S. at 359. For a discussion of recent litigation concerning the curtailment of a witness' extrajudicial statements, see note 152 infra. Similarly, the Court's suggestion to proscribe, where
appropriate, extra-judicial statements of opposing counsel, parties to the proceeding, and court
officials, has also engendered much controversy. See, e.g., Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 251 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (only statements by
counsel that constitute "serious and imminent threat" to a fair trial may be proscribed by court
or disciplinary rule); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 236 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (dismissing as overly broad an order preventing parties, "'their relatives, close friends, and associates"' from discussing proceedings with members of the media); United States v. Tijerina,
412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969) (order preventing the attorney,
defendant, and witness from commenting, out of court, on merits of case was not violation of
those individuals' first amendment rights).
In Allen, the New Jersey supreme court acknowledged that a trial court would have "the
power to exercise sufficient control over the prosecutor, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses and court staff to prevent the release . . . of improper information." 73 N.J. at 145, 373
A.2d at 383. See also State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964) (unethical
conduct for prosecution or defense to provide the media with extra-judicial statements suggestive
of a defendant's guilt or innocence).
67 384 U.S. at 359-63. The Sheppard Court issued a general directive that "[tihe courts
must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial
outside interferences." Id. at 363.
66 Landau, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due Process Proposal, The Challenge of the Communications Media, 62 A.B.A.J. 55, 56-57 (1976). A study by the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press found that there had been at least 174 cases involving restrictive orders
during the nine-year period following the Sheppard decision. Id. at 55. This total consists of:
sixty-one cases that have attempted to close court proceedings or seal their records; sixty-three
cases involving the imposition of a prior restraint on the statements of trial participants; thirtynine cases concerning the issuance of a prior restraint on publication; and, eleven cases dealing
with a restriction on photography in relation to a judicial proceeding. Id. at 57.
69 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
70 Id. at 542. For an informative background study of the Simants prosecution, see
Friendly, A Crime and Its Aftershock, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1976, § 6 (Magazine), at 16.
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spondent Stuart, a state court judge, issued a restrictive order to bar
publication of evidence and testimony adduced at Simants' preliminary hearing. 7 1 The order was to remain in effect until the jury was
impaneled, since the judge feared that jury selection would be hindered by the widespread publicity that the case was attracting,
' 72
thereby "'imping[ing] upon the defendant's right to a fair trial.'
Various representatives of the press appealed the order to the
Nebraska supreme court, but that court upheld a modified version of the
order. 73 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and thereafter reversed the Nebraska supreme court, finding the order violative of the
first amendment guarantee of a free press.

74

Although the jury had already rendered a verdict in the murder
trial, the Court declined to dismiss the case as moot, noting that such
a controversy was likely to recur. 7 5 The Court also noted that since

71 427 U.S. at 543. A restrictive order was originally issued by a Nebraska county court at
the request of the prosecution and defense. Id. at 542. The order effectively prohibited the
press from reporting on Simants' preliminary hearing, which was conducted publicly in the
county court. Id. at 542-43. After Simants was bound over to the state's district court for trial,
numerous press associations moved for leave to intervene in the district court proceedings for
the purpose of challenging the county court's restrictive order. Id. at 543. judge Stuart granted
the petitioners' motions to intervene, vacated the order, and proceeded to impose his own
restrictive order. Id. The new order, which was to remain in effect until the jury was impaneled, prohibited the petitioners from reporting on the following: a confession by Simants
which was introduced in open court at his arraignment; medical testimony adduced at the preliminary hearing; statements made by Simants "to other persons"; the content of a note written
by Simants on the night of the crime; the names of the murder victims; and, the scope of the
restrictive order. Id. at 543-44.
72 Id. at 543. The commission of the crime had "attracted widespread news coverage, by
local, regional, and national newspapers, radio and television stations." Id. at 542.
73 Id. at 544-45. While the appeal of the state district court order was pending before the
Nebraska supreme court, the petitioners appealed to Justice Blackmun, in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Eighth Circuit, 427 U.S. II, to stay the state court's order. 427 U.S. at 544
n.2; see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1319 (1975) (Blackmun, Circuit justice) (in
chambers). Justice Blackmun partially stayed the order, and the full Court later denied the
petitioners' request for a more extensive stay. 427 U.S. at 544 n.2; see Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327 (1975) (Blackmun, Circuit Justice) (in chambers).
Despite the petitioners' initial request for an expedited appeal, the Nebraska supreme
court issued a per curiam opinion one month later, modifying the state district court's order.
427 U.S. at 544-45; see State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 801, 236 N.W.2d 794, 805 (1975) (per
curiam). The modified order prohibited the press from reporting on: confessions made by Simants to law enforcement officers; confessions or admissions made by the defendant to third
parties, except for those statements made to members of the media; and, any "facts 'strongly
implicative' of the accused." 427 U.S. at 545.
7' 427 U.S. at 570; see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1027 (1975) (granting certiorari).
75 427 U.S. at 546-47. The restrictive order, by its own terms, had expired when the jury
was impaneled. Id. at 546. Despite the order's expiration, the Court concluded that its jurisdiction would attach since "the underlying dispute between the parties is one 'capable of repeti-
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the orders were, by nature, "short-lived," they were susceptible of
evading appellate review, thereby necessitating a definitive determination of the issue by the Court. 76 Proceeding to the merits of the
case, Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality of the Court, initially noted that the right of the press to freely report on newsworthy
events, and the right of the defendant to have a fair trial, were of
equal importance. 77 The Court then examined the evidence which
had been presented to the trial judge in order to determine whether
the alleged dangers presented by the publication of the material were
reasonably certain to occur, thereby justifying the imposition of the
restraints. 78 In so doing, the Court found that the trial court had
failed to demonstrate with a reasonable degree of certainty that absent the restraints, a fair and impartial jury could not have been
selected. 7 9 The Chief Justice stated that the trial court could have
employed alternative measures such as change of venue, or a voir
dire examination of prospective jtirors to eliminate those who may
tion, yet evading review.' " Id. (quoting Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498,
515 (1911)). The Court concluded that the controversy could recur if Simants' conviction was
reversed by the state supreme court. 427 U.S. at 546. Furthermore, since the state was a party
to the Press Association's initial appeal to the state supreme court, that court's modified order
could be interpreted as permitting the state prosecutors to employ restrictive orders in similar
cases. Id. at 546-47.
76 427 U.S. at 547. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
77 427 U.S. at 561.
'8 Id. at 562-69. The Chief Justice found it necessary to determine whether " 'the gravity of
the "evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies such [an] invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.' " Id. at 562 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d
Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)). To reach such a determination, he examined such factors
as the nature and scope of the pretrial publicity, the efficacy of a restrictive order in providing
for a fair trial, and whether alternatives existed which could have been employed to limit the
pretrial publicity. 427 U.S. at 562.
79 427 U.S. at 569. Upon review of the evidence before the trial judge, Chief Justice Burger
conceded that it was reasonable to conclude that the pervasive pretrial publicity "might impair"
Simants' right to a fair trial. Id. at 563. The issuance of a restrictive order, however, was not
found to be an effective means of protecting the defendant's rights. Id. at 565-66. The Chief
Justice noted the difficulty of "managing and enforcing" such an order, since it would be necessary to obtain in personam jurisdiction over "at-large" publications, as opposed to those publications located within the jurisdiction of the court. Id. In fact, the county court in Simants lacked
jurisdiction over the petitioners. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 795, 236 N.W.2d 794, 802
(1975) (per curiam). The county court's general order restraining "'the news media"' could have
been disregarded by the press with impunity, for " [t]he courts have no general power in any
kind of case to enjoin or restrain 'everybody."' Id. When the media associations appeared before the district court to contest the restrictive order, however, they voluntarily submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. id.; see 427 U.S. at 566 n.9.
The Court further noted that due to the small size of the community, rumors of what had
occurred were likely to abound, which could prove to be more damaging than an accurate news
account. 427 U.S. at 567. Yet, the Court posited that "a whole community cannot be restrained
from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it." Id.
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have been prejudiced by the publicity. 80 Such methods were preferable to the use of prior restraint of publication, which was considered
"one of the most extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence."81 The Court concluded that the orders restraining publication of information adduced at an open preliminary hearing were invalid, for the press may freely report on that which transpires in the
courtroom. 8 2 Similarly, the Court held that reporting based on
material obtained from sources other than courts, such as admissions
by the defendant to third parties, was also not subject to restraint, in

80 427 U.S. at 563-64. The Court also noted as possible alternatives the postponement of a
trial until publicity had subsided, and the issuance of "emphatic and clear instructions" to
jurors, reminding them of their duty to decide issues solely on evidence adduced in open court.
Id. Additionally, the use of sequestration of jurors could be resorted to, either before or after
the jury was impaneled. Id. at 564. The Court concluded that on those past occasions when it
"has reversed a state conviction because of prejudicial publicity, it [the Court] has carefully
noted that some course of action short of prior restraint would have made a critical difference."
Id. at 569.
81 Id. at 562.
82 Id. at 568; see notes 52 & 53 supra and accompanying text.
The Burger Court, on several occasions, has refused to hinder attempts at reporting information revealed in open court. See Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308
(1977) (per curiam); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). For example, in the
term immediately preceding the Nebraska decision, the Court in Cox Broadcasting held that a
state could not prohibit the publication of information contained within court records which
were open to public inspection. Id. at 491, 496. There, a reporter was found to be free from
civil liability for broadcasting the name of a rape victim, despite a state statute which prohibited
such disclosure. Id. at 471-72, 497. The reporter, however, had discovered the victim's name
by an in court examination of the indictments of her assailants. Id. at 472. Thus, the Court
concluded that once truthful information from court records is placed in the public domain, "the
press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it." Id. at 496.
A similar rationale was employed by the Court in the term immediately following the
Nebraska decision in Oklahoma Publishing Co., 430 U.S. at 311-12. In Oklahoma, the name
and photograph of a juvenile was published subsequent to a detention hearing attended by
members of the press, in which the juvenile was accused of "delinquency by second-degree
murder." Id. at 309. Several days later, the minor was arraigned at a closed hearing, whereupon
the judge entered a restrictive order enjoining the publication of the juvenile's name or picture.
Id. & n.1. The press unsuccessfully appealed the order in the state courts, where it was held
that state law provided for private juvenile proceedings unless otherwise directed by a judge.
Id. at 309-10. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court, which held in a per curiam opinion that the restrictive order was violative of the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 309,
311-12. The Court commented that regardless of whether the judge had originally ordered the
juvenile's hearing open to the public pursuant to the state statute, he, nevertheless, knowingly
permitted the proceedings to be conducted in the presence of the press. Id. at 311. Furthermore, at no time were any objections raised by the judge, prosecutor, or defendant to the
media's presence at the proceeding, or to the press' photographing the accused. Id. Since the
juvenile's name and photograph had been "'publicly revealed'" at the hearing, the Court
applied the Cox Broadcastingand Nebraska rationale that a court may not restrict the publication of information obtained pursuant to a judicial proceeding, once it is placed in the public
domain. See id. at 310-12.
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circumstances warranting the imthe absence of a showing of exigent
83
position of a restrictive order.
. The Nebraska decision was issued subsequent to the press restrictions ordered in the Allen and Hughes criminal trials, but prior to
oral arguments in the newspapers' appeal of those orders before the
New Jersey supreme court.8 4 Initially, the Allen court was faced
with a threshold question of mootness. 85 Since the criminal trials in
which the orders were issued had terminated prior to the supreme
court's review of the appeals, arguably there was no longer a justiciable controversy. 86 The Allen court noted, however, that the appeals
involved issues of "great public importance" which were certain to
recur.8 7 It therefore determined that it would be "paradoxical" to
require that such issues be "viable" at the time of review by the
supreme court, when, given the nature of the adjudicatory process, a
trial, from which the issue arose, would usually have ended before
the court could pass upon the merits of the appeal. 8 8 Accordingly,
the court declined to dismiss the appeals as moot. 8 9
In passing upon the merits of the case, the Allen court found the
Nebraska decision to be controlling. 9" Justice Sullivan, for the
majority, interpreted Nebraska as granting to the press an "absolute
right or privilege" to report on all events which transpire in open
83 427 U.S. at 570. For a discussion of the showing required to overcome the presumption
of invalidity for a prior restraint on publication, see note 46 supra and accompanying text.
84 The restrictive orders were entered in the Allen and Hughes trials in February and
March of 1976, respectively. 73 N.J. at 137, 373 A.2d at 379: Brief for Appellant, Gannett Co.,
supra note 1, at 2. On appeal, the briefs for the state and the appellant newspapers refer to the
Nebraska case as pending before the Supreme Court. Brief for Appellant, Gannett Co., supra note
1, at 19; Brief for Appellant, Trenton Times Corp., supra note 16, at 11 n.7; Brief for State,
supra note 1, at 28-29. After the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in Nebraska on June
30, 1976, 427 U.S. at 539, the appellant Trenton Times Corp. submitted a reply brief maintaining that Nebraska was "dispositive of the issues" in the appellant's action. Reply Brief on Behalf
of Appellant, Trenton Times Corp., at 1, State v. Hughes, 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d at 377 (1977).
Oral arguments before the New Jersey supreme court took place on October 12, 1976, and the
court's decision was rendered on April 22, 1977. 73 N.J. at 132, 373 A.2d at 377.
s5 73 N.J. at 138-39, 373 A.2d at 380.
88 See id. at 137, 138, 373 A.2d at 379, 380. For a discussion of the appellant's argument in
Hughes that the case was not technically moot, see note 22 supra.
87 73 N.J. at 138, 373 A.2d at 380. New Jersey courts have frequently refused to dismiss an
appeal as moot, where the issue involved is of "overriding [public] importance." Id. at 147, 373
A.2d at 384 (Pashman, J., concurring); see, e.g., Housing Auth. of Newark v. West, 69 N.J.
293, 295-96, 354 A.2d 65, 66-67 (1976); Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 364, 307 A.2d 571, 578
(1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58
N.J. 576, 579, 279 A.2d 670, 671 (1971).
88 73 N.J. at 139, 373 A.2d at 380.
89 id. at 138, 373 A.2d at 380.
90 Id. at 140, 373 A.2d at 380. The restrictive orders contested in Nebraska and Oklahoma

Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam), were imposed before a jury
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court. 9 1 Consequently, the Allen court held that the trial courts' orders, which restrained the press from reporting on open court pro92
ceedings, were "clearly illegal."
The issue whether the orders imposed an unconstitutional prior
restraint upon the press was extensively briefed by those party to the
appeal. 9 3 Although the majority did not specifically address these
contentions, the court did make reference to the discussion in
Nebraska on prior restraint of publication. 94 The court determined,
however, that this analysis was "not directly applicable" to the Allen
case, since that portion of the Nebraska decision dealing with prior
restraint was directed at information derived "from sources other than
95
public court proceedings."
The issue whether the trial court's orders posed a prior restraint
on publication, in violation of first amendment guarantees, was, however, thoroughly explored by Justice Pashman, who issued a concurring opinion. 96 Initially, Justice Pashman outlined the United States
Supreme Court's long opposition to prior restraints on publication,
and its consistent holdings that such restraints were presumptively
invalid. 9 7 While finding the prohibition against prior restraints to be

was impaneled, while those in Allen were issued after the jury had been impaneled. Justice
Pashman, however, concluded that "this is an insufficient basis for distinguishing the result in
these [Allen and Hughes] appeals from those in the Nebraska and Oklahoma cases." 73 N.J. at
160, 373 A.2d at 391 (Pashman, J., concurring). Compare Oklahoma, 430 U.S. at 308 and
Nebraska, 427 U.S. at 546 with Allen, 73 N.J. at 135, 137, 373 A.2d at 378, 379.
91 73 N.J. at 140, 373 A.2d at 380.
92 Id.
93 See Brief for Appellant, Gannett Co., supra note 1, at 6-24; Brief for Appellant, Trenton
Times Corp., supra note 16, at 5-24; Brief for State, supra note 1, at 7-28.
94 73 N.J. at 139-40, 373 A.2d at 380.
95 Id. It is arguable that by prohibiting the press from reporting on open court proceedings,
a court is, in effect, imposing a prior restraint on press publication. Under accepted rules of
judicial construction, however, the Allen court chose not to address the prior restraint issue, id.
at 139, 373 A.2d at 380, since "an appellate court need not decide a case on every ground
advanced by the successful litigant or held by the trial court, when less will sustain the judgment." Schaad v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, 72 N.J. 237, 250, 370 A.2d 449, 456
(1977). This principle of construction, when applied to constitutional issues, is termed "'the rule
of necessity,"' which provides "that the resolution of controversies on constitutional grounds is
to be avoided where possible." Id. at 250-51, 370 A.2d at 456; see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.
288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
96 73 N.J. at 150-57, 373 A.2d at 385-89.
97 Id. at 152, 373 A.2d at 386; see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971) (per curiam); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
The Burger Court's refusal to impose a prior restraint on publication is similar to the protection afforded first amendment rights by past Courts. See Steamer, Contemporary Supreme
Court Directions in Civil Liberties, 92 POLITICAL SCI. Q. 425, 429, 438 (1977). In light of this
continuity of opinion, one commentator has concluded that "the Court under Warren or Stone
or Hughes, and not inconceivably under Vinson, could have authored the decisions involving
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virtually absolute, he did note one possible exception where a restriction on press reporting was necessary for "military security" purposes. 9 8 Yet, relyi*ng on New York Times Co. v. United States, 99
Justice Pashman concluded that prior restraints, even those under the
"military security" exception, are only valid in extreme
circumstances. 10 0 In the New York Times case, a prior restraint was
rejected despite intimations that the release of classified material
could damage the country's military and diplomatic positions concerning the Viet Nam conflict. 10 1 From the nine separate opinions filed
in New York Times, Justice Pashman gleaned that the majority would
only allow a prior restraint to issue if it were shown that an "impending direct and immediate harm, of a grave nature" would otherwise
result. 102
In applying this criterion to the orders issued in Allen, Justice
Pashman concluded that the state had failed to show any compelling
reason which would have necessitated the imposition of a prior restraint on publication.' 0 3 The restrictive orders were not issued to
prevent a "direct and immediate harm"; rather, they were issued
merely upon the possibility of prejudice to the defendants. 10 4 Even
prior restraint such as the Pentagon Papers Case [New York Times Co. v. United States] ...
[and] the Nebraska Press Case .... "Id. at 438 (footnotes omitted).
98 73 N.J. at 152, 373 A.2d at 387. The "military security" exception to the rule prohibiting
prior restraint of the press was established by the Court in Near. 283 U.S. at 716. For further
discussion of the exceptions allowed by Near, see note 38 supra.
99 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
100 73 N.J. at 153-54, 373 A.2d at 387.
101 403 U.S. at 714, 763 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The New York Times had acquired, and
subsequently published, a classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on
Viet Nam Policy." 403 U.S. at 714, 759-60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Upon publication of the
purloined document, the United States Government sought to enjoin the Times from further
publication of the classified material. Id. at 714. The district court held that the Government had
not met its burden of justifying the restraint, and this decision was ultimately upheld by the
Supreme Court. Id.
102 73 N.J. at 153-54, 373 A.2d at 387. In New York Times, Justice Brennan concluded that a
prior restraint on the press can only be valid if it is shown that publication of the material would
"inevitably, directly, and immediately" produce a grave threat to the nation's security. 403 U.S.
at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring). In his opinion the Government had failed to prove that such
a serious harm would occur in the absence of a prior restraint on publication. Id. at 727. A
similar result was reached by Justice Stewart since it was not shown that publication of the
material would cause "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people."
Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justices Black and Douglas "took an absolute position," 73
N.J. at 153, 373 A.2d at 387 (Pashman, J., concurring), for they maintained that the first
amendment precluded governmental restraint of the press. 403 U.S. at 715 (Black, J., concurring), 720 (Douglas, J., concurring); see 73 N.J. at 153-54, 373 A.2d at 387 (Pashman, J., concurring).
103 73 N.J. at 154, 373 A.2d at 387.
104 Id. at 154, 156-57, 373 A.2d at 387, 389. In both the Allen and Hughes cases, the restrictive order was entered prior to a hearing on the admissibility of the evidence. Id. at 156, 373
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if media reports of events related to the trial had reached the jurors,
this alone would have been insufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice. 10 5 If it could be shown, however, that the publicity had actually prevented a juror from fairly determining a defendant's guilt or
innocence, then prejudice would be deemed to exist. 06 Although
both trial courts attempted to protect the defendants from jury prejudice through the imposition of the restrictive orders, Justice
Pashman concluded that the courts had failed to make the necessary
preliminary determination that the jurors would have been unable to
render a fair verdict in the absence of a prior restraint on publica10 7
tion.
A.2d at 389. The judges, therefore, had no means of determining whethier the proffered testimony would be prejudicial, and if so, the extent to which such information would be covered
by the press, or the impact any media reports would have upon the-jurors. Id. at 156-57, 373
A.2d at 389. Justice Pashman thus concluded that both trial courts had "engaged in the speculative type of reasoning which underlies our distrust of prior restraints on the press." Id. at 157,
373 A.2d at 389.
105 See id. at 154, 373 A.2d at 388. In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), a case involving
prejudicial pretrial publicity, the Court held that jurors are not required to "be totally ignorant
of the facts and issues involved" in a particular case prior to trial. Id. at 722. Due to the "swift,
widespread and diverse methods of communication" presently existing, id., the Court concluded
that
[t]o hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or
innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a
prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is
sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court.
Id. at 723. In the case before it, however, the Court found the petitioner was denied a fair trial,
since the publicity surrounding the case was so pervasive and inflammatory that the jurors'
minds were permeated with preconceptions of the petitioner's guilt. Id. at 725-28. See also
Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800-01 & n.4 (1975) (jurors may be familiar with defendant's
past criminal activities, so long as it does not result in their having "an actual predisposition
against him").
A similar result was reached by the New Jersey supreme court in State v. Van Duyne, 43
N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964). The defendant, Van Duyne, appealed the denial of his motion
for a mistrial which was based upon the contention that the publishing of inculpatory statements
attributed to Van Duyne had denied him a fair trial. Id. at 383, 204 A.2d at 849. Upon examination of the trial court record, the court found that once the trial judge was apprised of the
prejudicial press reports, he allowed an extensive voir dire examination of potential jurors, and
permitted a reopening of the voir dire as to one juror who had already been sworn. Id. at 384,
204 A.2d at 849. As a result of the voir dire, those prospective jurors who had read the prejudicial articles, and had apparently formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, were excused from service. Id. at 385, 204 A.2d at 850. .Others who had read the artidles
were accepted as jurors upon swearing that they were not prejudiced by such reports, and that
they would render an impartial verdict based solely on evidence adduced in open court. Id.
Considering these precautions taken by the trial judge, the court concluded that it could not
"find sufficient evidence that the newspaper articles . .. prevented a fair trial or that they so
infected the minds of some of the jurors as to leave them biased against the defendant." Id. at
386, 204 A.2d at 851.
106 73 N.J. at 156, 373 A.2d at 389; see note 105 supra.
107 73 N.J. at 156, 373 A.2d at 389.
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After establishing that a court may not restrict the media's first
amendment right to report on open court proceedings, the Allen
court then sought to devise procedures for trial judges to utilize in
protecting a defendant's concurrent sixth amendment right to a fair
trial. 10 8 The majority suggested various alternatives available for
courts to employ to guarantee fair trials when, as in Allen, a question
arises regarding the propriety of press reporting on issues concerning
the admissibility of evidentiary material harmful to the defendant. 10 9
As the court indicated, the customary protective measure in New Jersey,
when evidentiary hearings are being conducted, "is to remove
the jury from the courtroom." 110 After the jury's removal, though,
most evidentiary hearings are conducted in open court, which gives
the press an "absolute right" to report on those proceedings, thereby
creating the possibility that jurors would learn what had transpired in
their absence."' This problem could have been obviated by the
media's strict adherence to guidelines adopted by the New Jersey
Press Association and the supreme court, which prohibit the reporting of evidence adduced at such hearings until completion of the
trial. 112 The Allen court noted, however, that the bar-press agreement has no legally binding effect, but rather depends on voluntary
compliance. 113
Due to the inadequacies presented by either jury removal or the
use of bar-press guidelines, the court turned to more efficacious remedies to ensure a fair trial for the defendant. 11 4 One "obvious solution" recommended by the Allen court, to prevent jurors from becoming prejudiced by out of court statements published during the
course of a trial, is to sequester the jury. 115 This remedy, however,

Id. at 140-45, 373 A.2d at 381-83.
Id. at 140, 373 A.2d at 381.
110Id. at 140-41, 373 A.2d at 381. For a further discussion of the customary procedure for
holding evidentiary hearings, see note 3 supra.
"I Id. at 141, 373 A.2d at 381. With.regard to evidentiary hearings conducted in open court,
the Nebraska Court commented that "once a public hearing had been held, what transpired
there could not be subject to prior restraint." 427 U.S. at 568.
112 73 N.J. at 141, 373 A.2d at 381. The court noted that guideline five of the Statement of
Principles and Guidelines for Reporting of Criminal Procedures provided in pertinent part that
"'ItIhe
Press is free to report any judicial public proceeding, except that any evidence excluded
by the court at a hearing outside of the jury's presence shall not be published until after the
trial is concluded."' Id.
113Id. Justice Sullivan remarked that the "compulsion [of the bar-press agreement] is moral
and not legal and some members of the press have not always respected it." Id.
114 Id. at 141-42, 373 A.2d at 381-82.
115 Id. at 141, 373 A.2d at 381. Juror sequestration is of great utility since it can be employed
at any time after a juror has been sworn. See Nebraska, 427 U.S. at 564; N.J.R. 1:8-6, Com108

109
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presents numerous problems, primarily the excessive costs associated
with secluding a jury. 116 Another difficulty is the personal hardships
often endured by the sequestered jurors, which in turn hampers the
jury selection process. 1 1 7 It was further posited that sequestered
jurors would resent the defendant, holding him or her responsible for
the imposition of the sequestration order. 11 8 The court also pointed
out that New Jersey court rules restrict the use of sequestration to
"compelling circumstances." 119 Despite these failings, the majority
give serious
concluded that in highly publicized trials, judges should
120
consideration to the possibility of jury sequestration.
Another alternative posited by the Allen court is to have a judge
issue "clear and definitive" cautionary instructions, warning jurors not
to engage in reading or listening to media reports regarding the court
ment 2. Guidelines adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) dealing with news coverage
of court matters recommend that sequestration be permitted in highly publicized trials upon
motion of either party, or upon the court's own motion, when appropriate. ABA PROJECT ON
STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS

RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS

§ 3.5(b) (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA TRIAL GUIDELINES]. A study undertaken by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York concerning fair trial-free press
conflicts suggested that sequestration be utilized more frequently than it has been in the past,
finding it "in theory, [to be] an ideal remedy for publicity appearing during the trial." SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE ASSOCIA-

58
(1967). See also Note, Sequestration: A Possible Solution to the Free Press-FairTrial Dilemma, 23 AM. U. L. REV. 923, 933-34 (1974) (sequestration effectively insulates jurors from
prejudicial publicity without imposing restrictions upon press).
116 73 N.J. at 141, 373 A.2d at 381. The court made reference to a newspaper article in
which it was estimated that the cost of sequestering a jury in a recent New Jersey murder trial
amounted to $75,000. Id. at 141 n.2, 373 A.2d at 381.
117 73 N.J. at 141-42, 373 A.2d at 381.
118Id. at 142, 373 A.2d at 381; see N.J.R. 1:8-6, Comment 2 (inconvenience associated with a
sequestration order may generate juror hostility towards the defendant or the state). See also
Meyer, Free Press v. Fair Trial: The judge's View, 41 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 14, 18 (1964)
(sequestered juror may be hostile towards "the person requesting the lock-up procedure"); Will,
Free Press v. Fair Trial, 12 DE PAUL L. REV. 197, 209 n.39 (1963).
119 73 N.J. at 142, 373 A.2d at 381. New Jersey Court Rule 1:8-6(a) provides that:
The jury shall not be sequestered in any action, civil or criminal, prior to the instructing of the jury by the court, unless the court, in its discretion so orders on its
findings that there are extraordinary circumstances requiring sequestration for the
protection of the jurors or in the interests of justice.
N.J.R. 1:8-6(a). If a jury is not sequestered, then the individual jurors will be allowed to leave
the courthouse premises unattended "for the night, for meals, and during other authorized
intermissions in the deliberations" upon the discretion of the trial judge. N.J.R. 1:8-6(b). Although this form of jury dispersal was recommended to the supreme court by a special committee on jury deliberations for use in those cases where a court, within its discretion, deemed it
appropriate, the committee cautioned that, in general, "the presumption against sequestration,
which applies during the course of trial [should] not carry over to the deliberation phase."
N.J.R. 1:8-6, Comment 3.
120 73 N.J. at 145, 373 A.2d at 383; see id. at 165, 373 A.2d at 393 (Pashman, J.,concurring).
TION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL
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proceedings. 121 Furthermore, jurors should be instructed that they
are to reach a verdict based solely on evidence presented to them in
open court.12 2 The Allen court did concede, however, that it would
often be difficult to conclude that a juror could completely avoid contact with media reports, or that such instructions could "overcome
prejudice to a defendant" if a juror does become aware of inadmissible inculpatory information.1 2 3 In any event, the court proposed that
in trials with extensive press coverage, the use of cautionary instructions should be a minimal requirement to protect a defendant's right
24
to a fair trial.1
A final recommendation offered by the court is the utilization of
in camera proceedings. 1 25 With the consent of the defendant, a
closed evidentiary hearing may be held to the exclusion of the press,
the public, and the jury.1 26 Thus, a nonsequestered jury would have
neither knowledge of the contested evidence, nor the means to obtain
0

12173 N.J. at 142, 373 A.2d at 381; see id. at 164, 373 A.2d at 392 (Pashman, J., concurring).
The American Bar Association Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press suggested that
the following cautionary instruction be given to nonsequestered jurors before the conclusion of
the first day of trial:
During the time you serve on this jury, there may appear in the newspapers or on
radio or television reports concerning this case, and you may be tempted to read,
listen to, or watch them. Please do not do so. . . . (lf you read, listen to, or watch
these reports, you may be exposed to misleading or inaccurate information which
unduly favors one side and to which the other side is unable to respond. In fairness
to both sides, therefore, it is essential that you comply with this instruction.
ABA TRIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 115, at § 3.5(e). It was further recommended that the
jurors be reminded of this instruction at the end of each day's proceedings, and at other appropriate times. Id.
122 73 N.J. at 142, 373 A.2d at 381.
123

Id.

124

Id. at 145, 373 A.2d at 383.

Id. at 142, 373 A.2d at 382; see id. at 166, 373 A.2d at 393 (Pashman, J., concurring).
The American Bar Association's Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press recommended that
[i]f the jury is not sequestered, the defendant shall be permitted to move that
the public, including representatives of the news media, be excluded from any portion of the trial that takes place outside the presence of the jury on the ground that
dissemination of evidence or argument adduced at the hearing is likely to interfere
with the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
ABA TRIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 115, at § 3.5(d). The proposal also suggests that such
motions should be ordinarily granted by a judge, unless he or she finds "that there is no substantial likelihood" of trial interference. Id. A transcript will be kept during the course of the
closed proceeding, and made available to the public upon completion of the trial. Id. The
Committee also recommended that a similar procedure be employed at pretrial hearings. Id. at
,§3.1.
126 See 73 N.J. at 142, 373 A.2d at 382.
Although not specifically stated by the court, requiring the defendant to consent to the
closed hearings would presumably be necessary to conform to the state and federal constitutions
which guarantee the accused the right to a public trial. See note 5 supra; United States v.
12
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such knowledge. 1 27 Since the press has a right to cover only open
court proceedings, the Allen court believed that the use of closed in
camera proceedings would avoid the imposition of any "direct restraint" upon the media.' 2 8 The court did acknowledge, however,
that a question may arise regarding the constitutionality of such a
procedure which excludes the press and the public from court hearings.' 2 9 As this was not at issue in the appeals, the court merely
assumed the procedure to be constitutional without a decision on the
merits. 130 The court, however, did carefully condition resort to in
camera proceedings to those cases where other alternatives are found
to be unsuitable for the particular situation, 131 there is a "clear showing of a serious and imminent threat to the integrity of the trial," 132
and the defendant expressly consents to the closed proceedings. 1 33
While recourse to in camera hearings would be a rare occurrence
given the routine nature of many trials, the majority stated that when
such a procedure is employed, "it should be used with circumspec0
tion." 134
Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 922-23 (3d Cir. 1949) (trial judge cannot indiscriminately exclude members of general public from trial over objections of defendant).
The court cites Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972), for the proposition that
"[n]ewsmen . . . may be prohibited from attending or publishing information about trials if such
restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal." See 73
N.J. at 143, 373 A.2d at 382. The Supreme Court's statement, however, was apparently dictum,
for the issue in that case was whether a reporter has a testimonial privilege to refuse to testify
before a grand jury. 408 U.S. at 682.
127 See 73 N.J. at 143, 373 A.2d at 382.
128 See id. at 143-44, 373 A.2d at 382.
129 Id. at 144, 373 A.2d at 382-83. One commentator has suggested that the general public,
as well as the accused, has a right under the sixth amendment to have court proceedings publicly conducted. Wiggins, The Public's Right to Public Trial, 19 F.R.D. 25, 26, 30 (1955).
Although the Allen court did not object to the use of in camera proceedings, it did observe
that "[f]rom the standpoint of the press, the in camera procedure, while not a direct restraint,
arguably achieves the same result by more subtle means and becomes in effect a prior restraint
on the news-gathering ability of the press." 73 N.J. at 144, 373 A.2d at 382-83.
1- 73 N.J. at 144-45, 373 A.2d at 383.
131 Id. at 145, 373 A.2d at 383.
132 Id. For a discussion of the Allen court's required showing of harm, see notes 192-95 infra
and accompanying text.
13 73 N.J. at 145, 373 A.2d at 383. For an explanation of the necessity of obtaining the
defendant's consent, see note 126 supra.
1-4 73 N.J. at 144-45, 373 A.2d at 383. Most evidentiary hearings, as well as trials, contain
very little newsworthy material, and, therefore, are not often covered by the press. Id. at 144,
373 A.2d at 383. In addition, the brief duration of many trials generally renders "academic any
question of possible prejudice through news accounts." Id. When a question concerning the
voluntariness of a defendant's statement or the admissibility of certain evidence arises, a hearing,
and determination of the issue can often be had "without the necessity of disclosing the text of
the statement or the nature of the evidence." Id. Even if a court proceeding is subject to media
coverage, the Allen majority believed that "the willingness of the news media to exercise self
restraint [should not] be overlooked." Id.
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Pashman offered several other
options that a trial court could employ to protect a defendant's right
to a fair trial without unduly restricting the press.135 In the instant
case, for example, he suggested that since the trial judge was uncertain whether the jurors were aware of any out of court information,
the judge could have conducted a voir dire examination of the
jury. 136 Any juror who had read the press reports would receive
cautionary instructions, or be dismissed from service if prejudiced,
with an alternate juror taking his or her place. 137 Justice Pashman
further maintained that if a judge was fairly certain that the remaining
jurors were likely to learn about the evidentiary information and be
prejudiced by it, an attempt should be made by that magistrate to
have the parties stipulate to the facts.'13 8 In the event that this action
proves unworkable, the judge must give consideration to sequestration of the jury, and he would ultimately be obliged to declare a
13 9
mistrial if sequestration proved to be unsuitable.
135 Id. at 160-66, 373 A.2d at 391-93.
136 Id. at 160, 373 A.2d at 391.
137 Id. With regard to the use of cautionary instructions, Justice Pashman commented that
such instructions were important since, in addition to ordering jurors to disregard certain information, they also informed jurors of their "proper role" in the judicial process. Id. at 164, 373
A.2d at 392. The cautionary instructions would have to be carefully worded, however, so as not
to arouse the juror's curiosity about the case, thereby possibly prompting him or her to disobey
the instructions. Id. Justice Pashman also warned that "realistic expectations should be made of
the jury" when cautionary instructions are utilized, for often such instructions alone will not be
sufficient to ensure a fair trial. Id. This approach would most likely be successful "where news
coverage is not widespread, the information contained in the reports does not conflict with
testimony proven in court, and it is factual rather than emotional in nature." Id. at 164, 373
A.2d at 393. See also State v. Curcio, 23 N.J. 521, 527-28, 129 A.2d 871, 875 (1957) (jurors
issued cautionary instructions presumed to follow them absent contrary showing).
138 73 N.J. at 160-61, 373 A.2d at 391. Justice Pashman stated that if less imposing
techniques, see notes 136 & 137 supra and accompanying text, fail, resort to sequestration, see
note 139 infra and accompanying text, should be had unless "the parties could [be] convinced
to stipulate to the facts." 73 N.J. at 161, 373 A.2d at 391. The Justice did not elaborate on the
propriety of stipulating to the facts. Where prejudicial information is involved, however, it
would appear to be difficult, if not impossible, to stipulate to such information without seriously
compromising one's case.
139 73 N.J. at 161, 373 A.2d at 391. When publicity concerning a trial is widespread or
particularly "emotional," individual jurors may be sequestered immediately upon' their acceptance by the court, even though a full complement of jurors has not yet been chosen. Id. at 165,
373 A.2d at 393; see, e.g., State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 388, 204 A.2d 841, 851 (1964).
Since the prejudicial information in Allen arose after the jury was impaneled, Justice Pashman
concluded that sequestration "would have successfully protected [the] defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights" had it been employed. 73 N.J. at 165, 373 A.2d at 393. Yet he advised that
sequestration is not a "panacea" for the problems created by prejudicial publicity. Id. Noting
the possible adverse consequences of sequestration, including excessive costs, inconvenience to
the jurors, and possible prejudice to the defendant, see notes 116-18 supra and accompanying
text, Justice Pashman stated that it should only be used when less burdensome measures would
prove to be ineffective. 73 N.J. at 165, 373 A.2d at 393. Thus, he reasoned that "in a highly
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By characterizing an in camera proceeding as "the only remaining alternative" to declaring a reversal or mistrial, Justice Pashman
140
clearly evidenced his displeasure with this type of proceeding.
While accepting the limited use of in camera proceedings, the Justice
warned that closed hearings may circumvent the right of the press to
report on events occurring in open court. 14 1 Justice Pashman's
analysis of an in camera proceeding was not restricted to first
amendment concerns; rather, it included what he termed "values associated with the criminal justice system." 142 Inherent in these values are compelling policy reasons for maintaining publicly held
trials. 1 43 Justice Pashman observed that other jurisdictions have refused to close trial proceedings, based upon a finding that the public
has a right to have an open judicial process. 144 This was so despite
the defendants' contentions that they would otherwise be denied fair
trials. 1 45 According to Justice Pashman, a similar result is obtainable
publicized trial it [sequestration] may be the only way of protecting First and Sixth Amendment
rights without resorting to either a mistrial or methods which impinge upon First Amendment
interests." Id.
140 73 N.J. at 166, 373 A.2d at 393.
141 Id. at 166, 373 A.2d at 393-94.
In discussing the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Nebraska, an attorney for the
Nebraska Press Association predicted that in the future attempts would be made to close court
hearings that would normally be open to the public. Prettyman, Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart: Have We Seen the Last of Prior Restraints on the Reporting of Judicial Proceedings?, 20
ST. Louis L. REV. 654, 661 (1976). He concluded that "[i]f courts begin closing hearings in
order to prevent potentially prejudicial publicity, the Supreme Court will be faced with 'prior
restraints' in a form different from, but just as effective as, the one struck down in Nebraska
Press Association." Id. (footnote omitted). This is similar to Justice Pashman's observation "that
the [improper] use of closed proceedings has the capacity to subvert the entire effect of our
decision today." 73 N.J. at 166, 373 A.2d at 394.
142 73 N.J. at 167, 373 A.2d at 394.
143 See id. Various benefits are attributed to the open trial process, the foremost being a
positive impact on witnesses who would be more inclined to testify truthfully in a public forum.
Wiggins, supra note 129, at 27. Those involved in the trial process would also be prompted to
be more conscientious in the performance of their duties, since they will be subjected to public
observation and criticism. Id. The public at large would benefit by learning more about the
workings of the adjudicatory system, and perhaps of litigation that may in some way affect them.
Id. at 28. Public proceedings may also operate to deter future transgressions of the law, for the
public would- be forewarned of the consequences of similar violations of existing laws. Id. Finally, by subjecting the judicial branch to intensive public scntiny, public confidence in the
courts is generated, and the integrity of the judicial system can be maintained. Id.
144 73 N.J. at 167-68, 373 A.2d at 394-95; see, e.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings,
107 Ariz. 557, 490 P.2d 563, 567 (1971) (public has right to observe court proceedings except in
cases "where there is a clear, present threat to the due administration of justice or one which
appeals primarily to the morbid and prurient"); E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App.
157, 167, 125 N.E.2d 896, 903 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701
(1975) (per curiam) (defendant can waive his right to a public trial, but not "the right of the
people to insist that the proceedings of the courts . . . be open to public view").
145 73 N.J. at 167, 373 A.2d at 394.

1978]

NOTES

9

97

in New Jersey, "predicated upon the common law nature of the trial
process, or upon court rule." 146

Although Justice Pashman, as well as the Allen majority, had reservations concerning the use of an in camera proceeding, Justice
Schreiber, in a concurring opinion, contended that such a proceeding
was valid in those instances "when the defendant so desires and the
subject-matter, if ruled inadmissible, may adversely affect the jury's
impartiality." 147 He remarked that although the first amendment
granted the press freedom from .prior restraint, it did not give the
media the right to report on confidential government affairs. 14 8 Similarly, the public was never granted a constitutional right to be present at all government activities. 149 Justice Schreiber found the use
of an in camera hearing to be a recognized form of a judicially protected proceeding, analogous to a sidebar conference, in which the
150
press and the public have no absolute right of access.
'- 73 N.J. at 168, 373 A.2d at 395. New Jersey Court Rule 1:2-1 provides that "[a]ll trials,
hearings of motions and other applications, pretrial conferences, arraignments, sentencing conferences (except with members of the probation department) and appeals shall be conducted in
open court unless otherwise provided by rule or statute." N.J.R. 1:2-1.
147 73 N.J. at 170, 373 A.2d at 395. For a discussion of the reservations expressed concerning
the use of in camera hearings, see notes 129 & 141 supra and accompanying text.
148 73 N.J. at 171, 373 A.2d at 396. Members of the press may be accorded special privileges
in order to facilitate the reporting of news events. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830-31
(1974). The press does not, however, have "a constitutional right of special access to information
not available to the public generally." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972); cf. 73 N.J.
at 173, 373 A.2d at 397 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (protections afforded the press through the
first amendment are predicated on "the right to criticize" rather than on "a right to know"). But
see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (press conferred with "a
preferred position in our constitutional scheme," enabling it "to bring fulfillment to the public's
right to know"). See also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 834 (press has "no constitutional right of
access" to state prisons to interview inmates); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850
(1974) (no right of access of press to federal prisons beyond that permitted the general public).
149 73 N.J. at 174, 373 A.2d at 398. But cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:4-6 to -21 (West 1976)
("Open Public Meetings Act" requiring all meetings of public bodies open to the public, except
for specified exceptions).
o5073 N.J. at 175-76, 373 A.2d at 398. In camera proceedings are a recognized part of the
judicial process. Id. at 175-77, 373 A.2d at 398-99. For example, in In re National Broadcasting
Co., 64 N.J. 476, 478-79, 317 A.2d.695, 696 (1974) (per curiam), the court allowed television
network artists to sketch courtroom proceedings for news broadcasts, except on those occasions
when the judge held hearings in camera. See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713-16
(1974) (in camera inspections of proffered evidence may be conducted by a court to protect the
confidentiality of Presidential communications); State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 163-64, 203 A.2d
1, 9 (1964) (in chambers bail hearings may be used to prevent possibly prejudicial pretrial
publicity).
It was further noted by Justice Schreiber that several New Jersey court rules provide for in
camera or closed proceedings. 73 N.J. at 175-76, 373 A.2d at 398. New Jersey Court Rule
3:6-6(a), for example, strictly delineates those individuals that may be present during grand jury
proceedings, while Rule 3 :6 -9(c) provides for an in camera hearing when a public official wishes
to contest a presentment returned against him, prior to its release. Closed hearings are also
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Although the supreme court's decision in Allen clearly rejects the
use of "gag" orders in open court proceedings, 15' the opinion fails to
satisfactorily resolve the continuing controversy regarding the extent
of a court's power to restrict the press from freely reporting on judicial proceedings. 15 2 By narrowly defining the issue before it as
whether a court may validly restrict the press from reporting on open
court proceedings, 153 the Allen court was able to support its decision
by reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Nebraska. 15 4 Although the New Jersey supreme court briefly analyzed the Allen and
Hughes cases under first amendment principles, 155 its primary attention was directed to alternatives that could be employed by courts to
protect a defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial.15 6 By so
doing, it was unnecessary for the Allen court to specifically discuss
any privileges or protections accorded the press through the first
amendment. 15 7 Thus, aside from open court hearings, the scope of
permissible press coverage of judicial proceedings free from restraint
has been left in doubt.
To date, there are few New Jersey court rules concerning the
procedure to be followed with regard to press interference, or the
used to examine prior statements of witnesses, so that irrelevant material may be excised.
N.J.R. 3:17-2. Additionally, Rule 5:5-1(b) provides for private hearings "in any matrimonial matter and in any matter affecting children." Juvenile delinquency and incorrigibility proceedings
are also conducted in private, with press attendance prohibited purslant to Rule 5:9-1.
A recommendation has been proposed by the National Conference of State Trial Judges to
allow the use of private pretrial hearings when a defendant's sixth amendment rights are in
jeopardy. 73 N.J. at 176, 373 A.2d at 399. Similarly, the American Bar Association has adopted
a proposal which provides for the closing of pretrial and trial hearings when necessary to provide a fair trial for the accused. ABA TRIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 115, at §§ 3.1, 3.5(d).
15173 N.J. at 139, 373 A.2d at 380.
152 The scope of the rights and privileges accorded the press by the first amendment has not
been clearly defined. At least one court has avoided the imposition of a direct restraint on the
press by preventing the trial participants, who would ultimately be the media's news sources,
from publicly discussing the trial proceedings. Central S. C. Chapter v. Martin, 431
F. Supp. 1182, 1184-86 (D.S.C. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
The United States Supreme Court is scheduled to review a New York decision which allows the exclusion of the press and the public from an in camera pretrial hearing to suppress
evidence. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 375, 380-81, 372 N.E.2d 544, 546,
550-51, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 758-59, 762-63 (1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1875 (1978). But see
United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 850, 854, 861 (3d Cir. 1978) (pretrial suppression
hearings are within scope of sixth amendment's public trial provisions, thereby preventing exclusion of press and public absent a showing of " 'strict and inescapable necessity' ").
153 73 N.J. at 139, 373 A.2d at 380.
154 Id. at 140, 373 A.2d at 380.
155 See id. at 139-40, 373 A.2d at 380-81.
156 Id. at 140-45, 373 A.2d at 381-83.
157 For a discussion of the first amendment issues raised by Justice Pashman in his concurring opinion, see notes 95-107 supra and accompanying text.
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possibility of press interference, with the administration of justice.
The lack of existing rules allows for the establishment of guidelines,
as in Allen, through a "piecemeal" caselaw approach. 15 8 As a result,
there is no uniform procedure encompassing the spectrum of problems which may arise from the issuance of a "gag" order. This is
particularly problematical in that neither the press nor the court is
certain which reportorial actions are subject to legal sanctions, or
what the appropriate judicial response should be.
In conjunction with the lack of discernible standards is the related problem of procedural fairness.' 5 9 For example, in both the
Allen and Hughes cases, none of the appellant newspapers were
served with process or represented by counsel when the "gag" orders
were directed from the bench in the respective cases. 160 In order to
prepare a proper defense to countermand an attempt to restrict press
coverage, a mandatory notice requirement should be established for

158 Justice Pashman, however, offers a differing point of view. 73 N.J. at 149, 373 A.2d at
385. The Justice believed that by deciding the issue in an expansive manner, the court was able
to pass upon the merits of the various alternatives available to trial courts, rather than to "'consider the various options in a piecemeal fashion" as they individually arose on appeal. Id. The
court's present consideration and adoption of trial procedures to protect the interests of the
accused, the press, and the general public would, therefore, avert "future infringements" of.the
first and sixth amendments, as well as promote judicial economy. Id. at 149-50, 373 A.2d at
385. See also Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 363-64, 307 A.2d 571, 578, appeal dismissed, 414
U.S. 1106 (1973) (court may deal with an issue in a narrow or expansive manner, as required for
its proper resolution). For a discussion of the alternatives proposed by the majority, see notes
115, 121 & 125 s'npra and accompanying text.
"' The Third Circuit addressed the issue of procedural fairness regarding restrictive orders
in United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
In Schiavo, a restrictive order was issued during the course of a federal perjury trial, prohibiting members of the press from reporting upon the murder and conspiracy indictments then
pending against the defendants. 504 F.2d at 3. Shortly thereafter, one of the newspapers subject to the order appeared before the trial court in an unsuccessful attempt to have the order
stayed pending appeal, or vacated. Id. at 4. The newspaper then appealed to the Third Circuit
on grounds that the order violated the first amendment, and that it was issued without proper
"procedural safeguards." Id. at 6. A plurality of the court of appeals reversed the district court's
oral restrictive order, finding the order to be "procedurally deficient," since the trial judge had
failed to reduce it to writing for nearly one week. Id. at 7-8. The court held that
[t]he district court should have vacated the oral order, held a prompt hearing after
notice to the involved members of the press and parties, and, if a silence order was
deemed to be justified, reduced such order to writing with specific terms and
reasons and had it entered on the district court docket.
Id. at 8 (footnote omitted). The appellate court concluded that failure to reduce the order to
writing had "an impermissible 'chilling effect"' on the rights of the press, for, in the absence of
a writing, the appellants would have little guidance on "precisely what conduct was prohibited."
Id.
160 Compare Brief for Appellant, Trenton Times Corp., supra note 16, at 3, with Brief for
Appellant, Gannett Co., supra note 1, at 3-4.
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those members of the press affected by the restriction. 16 1 Such a
requirement may in fact be constitutionally mandated by the due
16 2
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In light of this nation's historical concern for an unfettered
press, 163 an expedited appeals process should also be implemented to
minimize delays in publication which may result from the media contesting any order that affects its ability to report on courtroom proceedings. 16 4 In the Hughes case, for example, although the newspapers sought and were ultimately granted emergent relief, the press
was subject to the illegal restriction over a five day period, until the
order was finally stayed by the Chief Justice.1 65 Rather than contesting an ordered press restraint before the trial court judge who issued
the order, as was done in Allen and Hughes, 166 an immediate appeal
to the appellate division should be made available. In any event, a

161 The Supreme Court has required that an individual be given notice and a hearing before
a state can restrict his or her right of free speech. Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393
U.S. 175, 185 (1968). In Carroll, several Maryland courts had recognized the right of local
government officials to enjoin, through an ex parte proceeding, the holding of a rally by a racist
organization. Id. at 177-78. The Supreme Court, however, reversed, finding in those cases
where the adverse party is known to the party seeking the injunction, "'the failure to give
notice, formal or informal, and to provide an opportunity for an adversary proceeding ... is
incompatible with the First Amendment." Id. at 185. See also United States v. Schiavo, 504
F.2d 1, 7-8 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Nebraska, 427 U.S. at 591
(Brennan, J., concurring).
162 See Landau, supra note 68, at 58.
163 73 N.J. at 170-73, 373 A.2d at 396-97 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
164 In commenting upon the restraints imposed in New York Times, Justice Black stated that
"every moment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant,
indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment." 403 U.S. at 715 (Black, J.,
concurring). Furthermore, any delay might well destroy the contemporary news value of the
information subject to the restraint. Nebraska, 427 U.S. at 609 (Brennan, J., concurring).
An expedited appeals process has been suggested, whereby the appeal of any restrictive
order would have to be decided within a five day period by the highest state court empowered
to review such a matter. Note, Ungagging the Press: Expedited Relief from Prior Restraints on
News Coverage of Criminal Proceedings, 65 GEO. L. J. 81, 117-18 (1976). If at the conclusion
of the five day period the appropriate state court had failed to render a decision on the validity
of the restrictive order, the order would automatically expire, and the press could then publish
the material with impunity. Id. Since a final judgment would be rendered "by the highest court
of a State in which a decision could be had," 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the decision would be directly
appealable to the United States Supreme Court. See id.; Note, supra at 118. See also Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965) (state film censorship boards are valid provided their
procedures allow only brief delays, and "'assure a prompt final judicial decision"); Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 437-39 & n.1, 445 (1957) (state procedure to enjoin sale of
obscene material upheld, which provided for judicial determination of obscenity within two days
of hearing on the matter); N.J.R. 2:9-2 (time schedule for an appeal may be accelerated).
'6
Brief for Appellant, Trenton Times Corp., supra note 16, at 4.
1" Compare Brief for Appellant, Gannett Co., supra note 1, at 3-4 with Brief for Appellant,
Trenton Times Corp., supra note 16, at 2-3.
i,
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systematic priority in the appellate process should be established to
provide for the immediate resolution of those matters involving a restraint on publication. Expedition of the appeals process may also
help to eliminate potential problems of mootness which might otherwise arise. 167
During the course of publicized trials, courts should periodically
issue jury admonitions, directing the jurors to avoid media reports of
any matters related to the case, and reminding them of their duty to
render a verdict based solely on evidence presented in open
court. 1 68 In the event that potentially prejudicial media reports are
issued, a hierarchy of remedial alternatives should also be available
for judges to employ, beginning with those that pose the least restrictions on the press, as well as minimal burdens on the jurors. 169 Initially, an extensive voir dire examination of the jurors should be
conducted to discover, and thereupon eliminate, any prejudiced
members.170 The final determination whether a juror is incapable of
rendering an impartial verdict, despite his or her protestations to the
contrary, must remain within the trial judge's discretion. 171 A finding of prejudice would, of course, automatically result in the juror's
dismissal. 1 72 To compensate for dismissed jurors, a sufficient number
of alternate jurors should be impaneled to take the excluded juror's
place. 1 73 Thus, if a trial judge believes that the case before him is
particularly newsworthy, he should consider the possibility of
prejudicial publicity, and seek to mitigate its impact by impaneling a

167 Trials of relatively short duration might well conclude before an accelerated appeals process is completed, thus giving rise to claims of mootness. See, e.g., 73 N.J. at 138, 373 A.2d at
380. It appears, however, that such issues will not be dismissed as moot, as long as questions of
importance are involved that are likely to recur. Id. For a discussion of problems associated
with a claim of mootness, see notes 85-89 supra and accompanying text.
168 After a jury has been impaneled, a cautionary instruction should be given by a judge to
inform jurors of their duties. For a recommended cautionary instruction, see note 121 supra.
169 Compare 73 N.J. at 140-45, 373 A.2d at 381-83 with 73 N.J. at 160-69, 373 A.2d at
391-95 (Pashman, J., concurring).
170 See id. at 160-63, 373 A.2d at 391-92 (Pashman, J., concurring).
171 See State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 386, 204 A.2d 841, 850 (1964). The court in Van

Duyne stated that when a voir dire examination is conducted to determine whether a juror is
prejudiced, a trial judge must "analyze and evaluate carefully the words, attitude and demeanor" of each juror who professes to be impartial and unprejudiced. Id. If a judge should
have any "lingering doubt" concerning the juror's impartiality, then the court should excuse the
juror from service. Id.
o
172

Id.

173 In a criminal action in New Jersey, a maximum of four alternate jurors may be impaneled

to supplement the required twelve member jury. N.J.R. 1:8-2(a), (d). By comparison, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit the impaneling of tip to six alternate jurors, FED. R.
CRUM. P. 24(c), in addition to the usual twelve member jury. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b).
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full complement of sixteen jurors. 1 74 To meet the demands of an
exceptionally notarized trial, the New Jersey supreme court may consider modifying its court rules to allow for an increase in the
maximum number of allowable jurors from sixteen to eighteen, the
1 75
latter being the maximum allowed in federal courts.
Where trial publicity is so persuasive and extreme in nature that
even a juror conscientiously attempting to carry out his oath could
not help but to come into contact with such information, and be prejudiced by it, the only appropriate alternative is jury sequestration. 1 76 Although present court rules restrict the use of sequestration
to "extraordinary circumstances," 177 a highly publicized trial should
satisfy such a criterion. 178 Concededly, the burdens imposed upon
the jurors and the costs borne by the state pursuant to an order of
sequestration are considerable. 1 79 Few trials, however, could be expected to generate the extensive press coverage that would necessi180
tate recourse to sequestration.
Although the Allen court tacitly approved the use of in camera
proceedings, in actuality this approach is somewhat inconsistent with
the court's view on the invalidity of "gag" orders.' 8 There appears
to be no practical difference between an open hearing which cannot
be reported on by the press, and a closed hearing conducted out of
the presence of the press; in both cases the media is effectively restrained from publication. 1 82 In fact, the judicially recognized use of
in camera hearings imposes a greater restriction on the press than
does the impermissible "gag" order. Whereas a restrictive order
would permit the press to attend the hearing, but would delay publication of reports on the proceedings until the trial was concluded, an
174 See note 173 supra.
175 Id.

176See 73 N.J. at 164-65, 373 A.2d at 393 (Pashman, J., concurring).
177 N.J.R. 1:8-6(a). For the text of this section of the sequestration rule, see note 119 supra.

171 See 73 N.J. at 165, 373 A.2d at 393 (Pashman, J.,concurring).
179 For a discussion of problems attendant to an order of sequestration, see notes 116-19
supra.
180 Cf. 73 N.J. at 144, 373 A.2d at 383 (in camera proceeding would "seldom" be necessary,

since many evidentiary hearings, as well as trials, are not of "sufficient news interest to warrant
press coverage").
"I Compare 73 N.J. at 142-45, 373 A.2d at 382-83 (holding in camera proceeding to exclusion of the press) with id. at 140, 373 A.2d at 380 (absolute right of the press to report on a
'public court hearing").
182 The Allen court stated that the use of an in camera proceeding "would avoid any direct
restraint on the news media." Id. at 143-44, 373 A.2d at 382 (emphasis added). It might,
therefore, be inferred that a procedure which only indirectly burdens the press could be validly
employed by a trial court. Whether a direct or indirect restriction is imposed, the common
result is that the press would be effectively restrained from publication. See generally Prettyman, supra note 141, at 661.

19781

NOTES

in camera hearing would be conducted without any members of the
press in attendance. 183 Although a transcript of the in camera proceeding would be released at the conclusion of the trial, 184 reporting
based on a transcript is hardly the equivalent of a reporter's own
first-hand account. In such cases, the protective function of the press
as an observer and critic of the justice system would be thwarted.'18 5
The Allen court did, nevertheless, attempt to impose restrictions
on the use of in camera hearings. 1 86 Initially, the court required that
a closed proceeding could only be held with the consent of the defendant. 18 7 The defendant's consent, in effect, would constitute a
waiver of his constitutional right to a public trial.' 8 8 The court's decision allowing the defendant the opportunity to close the trial proceedings, however, resulted in an inadequate consideration by the
court of an equally important right recognized by other jurisdictions,
namely, "the public's right to [a] public trial." 189 Such a right appears to be recognized in New Jersey court rules which require open
court trials and hearings on motions.' 9 0 By closing what would ordinarily be open court proceedings, in camera hearings may violate the
spirit, if not the letter, of such a rule.
Providing further direction for the use of in camera proceedings,
the Allen court required "a clear showing of a serious and imminent
threat to the integrity of the trial" before such a proceeding could be
employed. 19 1 Although the court failed to offer any guidance concerning what would constitute such grievous circumstances, the language employed by the Allen court is very similar to the "clear and

183

In Hughes, the trial judge preferred to issue a restrictive order rather than hold an in

camera proceeding, in order that the press would be able to attend the hearing. Brief for
Appellant, Trenton Times Corp., supra note 16, at lla-12a. In justifying the issuance of the

restrictive order, the trial judge stated:
It was never my desire to deprive the press of knowing what took place on these
occasions. I would frankly want them to know. I have the alternative, of course, to
hold such a hearing in camera, and at that point they would know nothing. That has
not been my practice and is not my intention.
Id.
184 73 N.J. at 144 n.3, 373 A.2d at 382.
185 See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 350.
186 For a discussion of the restrictions placed upon the use of in camera proceedings, see
notes 131-34 supra.

73 N.J. at 145, 373 A.2d at 383.
'88For a discussion of the right of a defendant to a public trial, see note 5 supra.
189 Wiggins, supra note 129, at 25. But see 73 N.J. at 144, 373 A.2d at 382-83.
190N.J.R. 1:2-1. For the text of this rule, see note 146 supra. Irrespective of the existence of
this court rule, the public's right to an open trial "might be predicated upon the common law
nature of the trial process." 73 N.J. at 168, 373 A.2d at 395 (Pashman, J., concurring).
191 73 N.J. at 145, 373 A.2d at 383.
187
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present danger" test enunciated in Bridges v. California.192 In the
Bridges case, the Supreme Court stated that "the substantive evil
must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high" before freedom of speech or of the press can be restricted. 19 3 It
would then appear that the state and federal tests are identical and
may be profitably compared. In subsequent applications of the "clear
and present danger" test, the Supreme Court explained that the
danger must be "imminent" or "immediately imperil," and not be
merely "likely," "remote or even probable." 194 If the use of an in
camera proceeding is predicated upon such a clear and immediate
showing of harm, it is highly improbable that the strictures of the
Court's test could be met, for to assess the impact of possible media
reports on jurors would be to engage in pure speculation.' 9 '
The threat posed by the use of an in camera proceeding is fourfold in nature. Primarily, an in camera hearing may be improperly
used as a substitute for the illegal "gag" order.19 6 Since a judge can
no longer prevent the press from reporting on open court proceedings, he may employ an in camera hearing in its place, thereby
changing the form of the proceeding, while maintaining the same restraint on the press. 1 97 Secondly, once the use of an in camera proceeding to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial is established,
its utilization may become fairly routine, despite the Allen court's
warnings. 198 A defense counsel may conceivably feel compelled to
move for such a hearing to protect his client's rights, and a judge
would be disposed to grant such a motion to ensure a fair trial. 199
192 314 U.S. 252 (1941).

Id. at 263. For a discussion of the Court's holding in Bridges, see note 54 supra.
Craig, 331 U.S. at 376.
195 A trial judge would ordinarily use an in camera hearing without knowledge of whether
the information subject to the proceeding would in fact be published, and if so, whether the
jurors would learn of the reports. Cf. 73 N.J. at 157, 373 A.2d at 389 (Pashman, J., concurring)
193
194

(Allen and Hughes trial courts failed to substantiate the need for a prior restraint). Justice Brennan's discussion in Nebraska of the speculative nature of pretrial restrictive orders would seem

to be equally valid in the case of in camera proceedings. See 427 U.S. at 599-600 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). The Justice stated:
A judge . . . will be unable to predict the manner in which the potentially prejudicial information would be published, the frequency with which it would be repeated or the emphasis it would be given, the context in which or purpose for
which it would be reported, the scope of the audience that would be exposed to the
information, or the impact ... the information would have on that audience.
Id. (footnote omitted).
196See 73 N.J. at 166, 373 A.2d at 393-94 (Pashman, J., concurring).
"' Prettyman, supra note 141, at 661.
19sCf. Nebraska, 427 U.S. at 607-08 (Brennan, J.,concurring) (any established system of
prior restraints would inevitably be overemployed).
199 Cf. id. at 607-08 (Brennan, J., concurring) (once permitted, restrictive orders would be
routinely requested by defendant and granted by court).
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Thirdly, in granting a motion for an in camera hearing, a trial judge
would in effect be deciding what information the public may receive. 200 Such a decision would place the judge in the position of
being a censor of the press. 20 1 Finally, although the information
which could be curtailed through the use of an in camera proceeding
would appear to be of little public importance in a case similar to
20 2
Allen, future incursions may be far more substantial.
Courts, therefore, should strictly adhere to the prerequisites established in Allen when an in camera proceeding is utilized. 20 3 It is
possible, of course, that despite the best efforts of a court in applying
the above alternatives, a jury may nevertheless become prejudiced.
In such a situation, it would be imperative that the judge exercise his
ultimate authority by declaring a mistrial 20 4 and ordering a new
trial.205
A procedural system should be established, implementing the
above recommendations, in order that future courts may act uniformly when presented with a fair trial-free press conflict. This can be
done by the supreme court's promulgation of definitive court rules,
pursuant to its constitutional authority to regulate "the practice and
procedure" of New Jersey courts. 20 6 In furtherance of such an objective, the supreme court should take the matter under the advisement
of The Judicial Conference of New Jersey. 20 7 The Conference, an
advisory body consisting of judges, lawyers, legislators, and laymen,
was established by court rule "to assist the [s]upreme [c]ourt in the
consideration of improvements in the practice and procedure in the
200 Cf. id. at 605 (Brennan, J., concurring) (systems of prior restraint would result in judicial
determinations of what material is suitable for public dissemination).
201 See id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated that "at least in the context of prior restraints on publication, the decision of what, when, and how to publish is for
editors, not judges." Id. at 613. See also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 258 & n.24 (1974).
202 See 427 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). A more complex situation may develop
when a public official is charged with having committed a criminal offense. A judge might
reasonably conclude that the release of any information adverse to such an individual would
generate sufficient news coverage to jeopardize his or her right to a fair trial. Yet, should the
court forego an open hearing and withhold incriminating information concerning a public official
immediately preceding an election, "even a brief delay in reporting that information . . . may
have a decisive impact on the outcome of the democratic process." Id.; see Prettyman, supra
note 141, at 661 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 60, Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.

539 (1976)).
203

For a list of the prerequisites, see notes 131-33 supra and accompanying text.

204 See 73 N.J. at 161, 373 A.2d at 391 (Pashman, J., concurring).
25 N.J.R. 4:49-1(a), (c). A judge can grant a new trial if "it clearly and convincingly appears

that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law." Id.
200 N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 3.
207

See N.J.B. 1:35-1.

4:49-1(a).
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courts." 20 8 Within the Conference, a special committee could be
established to deal exclusively with proposing new court rules that
would protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, while preserving
freedom of the press.2 0 9 Representatives of the media should be included among the committee's members, thereby allowing the press
to participate in the development of procedural guidelines that would
ultimately affect its reporting.
Apart from the judicial conference, other means may be
employed to help foster greater cooperation between members of the
bench, the bar, and the press. For example, in the Allen case, the
trial judge held a brief in chambers discussion with two members of
the press to elicit their "reaction" to the imposition of his proposed
order. 2 10 A discussion of this type would make the press aware of
any problems which might result from media coverage of a particular
aspect of a trial. Being cognizant of potential problems that could
arise, the press might thereby voluntarily exercise self-restraint when
reporting on sensitive trial issues. 2 11 Voluntary restraint by the press
can also be promoted through the continued use of bar-press
2 12
guidelines. Despite the fact that these guidelines are not binding,
they are still of value in that they reflect a joint acknowledgment by
the court and the press of the respective roles and duties of each
2 13
institution.
The impact of the Allen decision remains to be seen in the prospective application of the New Jersey supreme court's guidelines by
trial courts in criminal prosecutions. If the Allen court's objective-to
provide the defendant a fair trial without impinging upon the freedom
of the press-is to succeed, voluntary self-restraint must be practiced
by all parties. Trial courts should resort to an in camera proceeding

208 Id. 1:35-1(a). Membership on the conference includes, among others, the justices of the
supreme court, various appellate division and superior court judges, state legislative leaders, the
state attorney general and public defender, the administrative director of the courts, clerks of
the supreme court and superior courts, designated county judicial officers, and leaders of state
and local bar associations. Id. 1:35-1(b)(1) to (6). A maximum of fifteen "representatives of the
general public" may also serve on the conference. Id. 1:35-1(b)(7). In addition, the supreme
court is empowered to create within the conference any committee which it deems "necessary
or desirable." Id. 1:35-1(d). Committee members, however, "need not be members of the conference." Id.
209 See note 208 supra. Members of the press should be appointed to such a special committee to represent the media's viewpoint.
210 Brief for Appellant, Gannett Co., supra note 1, app. C at 3-4.
211 See generally Nebraska, 427 U.S. at 612-13 (Brennan, J., concurring).
212 For a discussion of the New Jersey bar-press guidelines, see notes 112 & 113 supra and

accompanying text.
213

See generally Nebraska, 427 U.S. at 613 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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only in the most compelling circumstances, and the press should act
responsibly by reporting news, rather than by engaging in sensationalism. Only through the mutual cooperation by, and respect for,
all the parties involved, can the interests of the court, the defendant,
the press, and the public be served, and their rights protected.
Robert D. Laurino

